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Summary
This report examines the political and economic policies of Turkmenistan’s
authoritarian President Saparmurad Niyazov.  It discusses U.S. policy and assistance and
provides basic facts and biographical information.  This report may be updated.  Related
products include CRS Report RL33458, Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests, updated regularly.
U.S. Policy1
According to the Bush Administration, the United
States has “strategic and economic interests” in
Turkmenistan and “must remain engaged” with the
country to gain its “critical cooperation” in reducing
threats to regional stability, including terrorism and illegal
trafficking in drugs, weapons of mass destruction, and
persons.  Turkmenistan borders countries of security
concern, such as Afghanistan and Iran, and the country
“serves as a valuable assistance corridor to Afghanistan.”
U.S. aid aims to help Turkmenistan “achieve political
stability, independence, and integration into the global
economy.”  U.S. assistance is limited, however, by the
authoritarian government of Turkmenistan, but some U.S. aid is used to promote security
cooperation “in the interests of both countries”(State Department, Congressional Budget
Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2007; and U.S. Government Assistance to and
Cooperative Activities with Eurasia: FY2005 Annual Report, January 2006). 
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Basic Facts
Area and Population:  Land area is 188,457 sq. mi.;
slightly larger than California.  The Kara Kum desert
covers about 80% of land area.  Population is 5.0
million (CIA World Factbook, mid-2006 est.).
Ethnicity: 85% are Turkmen, 5% are Uzbek, 4% are
Russian, and others (CIA World Factbook, 2003 est.).
Turkmen clans include the Tekke, Ersary, and Yomud.
About 150,000 ethnic Turkmen reside elsewhere in
the former Soviet Union, and 3 million or more in Iran
and Afghanistan.
Gross Domestic Product: $39.5 billion; per capita
GDP is about $8,000 (CIA World Factbook, 2005 est.
purchasing power parity).
Political Leaders: President, Prime Minister, and
Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty (executive and
legislative body): Saparmurad Niyazov (also spelled
Saparmyrat Nyyazow); Chairman of the Mejlis
(legislature): Owezgeldi Atayew; Foreign Minister:
Rashid Meredov; Minister of Defense: Agageldi
Mammetgeldiyew.
Biography:  Niyazov, born in 1940, became the first
secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party (TCP) in
1985.  In  1990 and 1992, he won  uncontested presi-
dential elections, and a referendum in January 1994
extended his term until 2002.  In 1999, he was named
president for life.  He has created a “cult of
personality,” under which he is termed “the Eternally
Great Turkmenbashi,” leader of all Turkmen.  The
national oath includes the phrase “[if] I betray ....
Turkmenbashi, may my breath stop.”  He claims to
have authored a 3-volume moral guide, the Ruhnama,
that is required reading in secondary, medical, and
military schools and in mosques.
Cumulative U.S. aid budgeted for
Turkmenistan in FY1992-FY2005 was
$255.4 million (FREEDOM Support Act
and other agency funding), most involving
food aid and training and exchanges.
About 1,300 Turkmen students and
professionals have traveled to the United
States during FY2003-FY2005 on
U.S.-sponsored exchange programs.  By
comparison, EU grants and loans have
amounted to about $119 million.
Turkmenistan’s lack of progress in
economic and political reforms has been
cited by successive Administrations as a
reason why only limited U.S. aid is
provided (compared with other Central
Asian states).  The Administration
budgeted $7.65 million for Turkmenistan
for FY2006 (FREEDOM Support Act and
other foreign assistance, excluding
Defense and Energy Department funds),
and  requested $7.68 million for FY2007,
including $250,000 for Foreign Military
Financing (FMF; for communications
equipment), $395,000 for International
Military Education and Training (IMET;
for bringing officers to the United States
for language and rule of law training), and
$1.73 million for Peace Corps activities.
The State Department proposes to provide
$300,000 for Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related Programs, and
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (NADR-EXBS), to help
Turkmenistan combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other illicit
trafficking.  U.S. aid to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime aims to increase border
security along the Turkmen-Afghan and Turkmen-Kazakh borders and to reduce demand
for drugs within Turkmenistan.
Contributions to the Campaign Against Terrorism
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001,
the Turkmen foreign ministry stated that Turkmenistan’s  policy of neutrality and its
friendship with the Taliban precluded cooperation in a U.S.-led military campaign.  After
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin acceded to an expanded U.S. military presence in
Central Asia, however, Turkmen President Niyazov on September 24, 2001,  gave his
consent for ground transport and overflights to deliver humanitarian aid to support U.S.-
led anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan because “evil must be punished.” Turkmenistan
also permitted refueling privileges for humanitarian flights.  Nonetheless, the foreign
ministry still argued that Turkmenistan was “neutral” because it was not permitting
military basing or the “transport of arms” through Turkmenistan.  During a July 2004
visit, U.S. Central Command head John Abizaid thanked Niyazov for permitting up to
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40% of humanitarian aid sent to Afghanistan since September 11, 2001, to transit the
country, but he also urged Turkmenistan to democratize.  During his visit in August 2005,
Gen. Abizaid called for greater cooperation on terrorism, drug trafficking, and border
protection, and praised Turkmenistan’s increasing ties with Afghanistan, including its
proposals for a trans-Afghanistan gas pipeline.  Before the U.S.-led coalition launched
actions in Iraq, Niyazov made contradictory statements, but in April 2003, he endorsed
Saddam’s removal and called for establishing “democracy” in Iraq to safeguard the
interests of ethnic Turks living there.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Turkmenistan’s “neutral” foreign policy is enshrined in its constitution.  Niyazov has
declared that Turkmenistan’s “permanent neutrality” policy precludes joining political or
military alliances and that its “open door” policy entails good relations with East and
West.  The U.N. General Assembly in 1995 recognized Turkmenistan’s neutrality.
Turkmenistan has pursued close ties with both Iran and Turkey.  In addition to trade ties
with Iran, Turkmenistan is also interested in cultural ties with the approximately one
million Turkmen residing in Iran.  Turkmenistan supports some of Russia’s policies in the
region while endeavoring, where possible, to reduce Russian influence.  In 1992, the two
states signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty containing security provisions.
Although Turkmenistan joined the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS), it did not sign the Collective Security Treaty and Niyazov has refused to sign other
CIS agreements viewed as violating Turkmen sovereignty and neutrality.  Relations with
Uzbekistan have been volatile.  Both states vie for regional influence and argue over water
sharing.  After a November 2002 coup attempt against Niyazov, he accused Russia and
Uzbekistan of colluding with the plotters, and both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
mobilized troops along their borders (see CRS Report RS21384, Turkmenistan’s
Attempted Coup).  Russia, however, has pursued close ties with Turkmenistan (see below,
Energy).  Relations with Azerbaijan are contentious, particularly regarding ownership of
offshore oil fields.  In June 2006, Turkmen officials accused French diplomats, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a Radio Liberty
correspondent, and the Warsaw Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights of colluding with
Turkmen oppositionists in exile to subvert the government.
Turkmenistan’s armed forces number about 26,000, including 21,000 ground, 4,300
air, and about 700 naval/coast guard forces (The Military Balance 2005-2006).  Other
forces include police and security troops, a presidential guard, and border troops.  Niyazov
regularly purges the military, police, and security agencies, ostensibly to ensure their
docility.  Turkmenistan inherited a sizable arsenal from the Soviet Union, but many air
and ground craft may be inoperable.  Ukraine and Georgia have upgraded and repaired
some aircraft and vehicles as part of their payments for Turkmen gas.  Troops are
expected to grow their own food, earn money by picking cotton, and otherwise work
twenty or more days of each month on economic projects.  Large-scale conscription not
only fills military needs but also provides “labor armies” that work with no pay in the
energy or agriculture sectors.  In late 1999, Russia’s 1,000 border troops in Turkmenistan
pulled out at Turkmenistan’s request (some “special border troops” reportedly remain),
and  by 2002, Turkmenistan had replaced its officer corps with ethnic Turkmen.  In 1994,
Turkmenistan became the first Central Asian state to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace
(PFP).  Turkmen officers have participated in or observed several PFP exercises.
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Political and Economic Developments
Turkmenistan is the most authoritarian of the Central Asian states and has made
little or no democratization progress, according to the State Department.  Corruption and
nepotism are rife, and the largest clan, President Niyazov’s Tekke clan, dominates cultural
and political life.  Turkmenistan’s May 1992 constitution set up a “secular democracy”
embracing a presidential system of rule, and granted Niyazov overwhelming powers to
rule by decree as head of state and government, although other provisions called for a
balance of powers between executive, legislative, and judicial branches.  The constitution
includes an impressive list of individual rights (though not freedom of the press), but
emphasizes that the exercise of rights must not violate public order or damage national
security.  It created a 2,500-member People’s Council (Halk Maslahaty) with mixed
executive and legislative powers, consisting of the president, ministers, the fifty
legislators of the Supreme Council (Mejlis), “people’s representatives,” and others.  The
Halk Maslahaty serves as an occasional forum and rubber stamp for the president’s policy
initiatives.  Resurrecting pre-Soviet customs, a Council of Elders, hand-picked by
Niyazov, was also created to advise the president and choose presidential candidates.  The
Mejlis routinely supports presidential decrees and has little legislative initiative.  The
court system retains its basic Soviet-era form.  
In  December 1999, members of the Mejlis, the Halk Maslahaty, and Niyazov’s
National Revival Movement (a civic group) met in a joint session to approve changes to
the Constitution, including naming Niyazov president for life.  The State Department
termed the life term “a further step backward on the path toward democracy.”  Niyazov
has proclaimed that no one over 70 years of age should be president, so he will step down
and a “democratic” presidential election will be held at the end of the decade.
The most recent election of the 50-member Mejlis was held on December 19, 2004.
All candidates were pre-screened members of the Democratic Party.  The OSCE offered
to send an assessment team but was refused.  Whereas the Central Electoral Commission
reported a Soviet-era 99.8% turnout in 1999, it reported a 76.9% turnout in 2004. The
State Department reported that diplomats found polling stations mostly empty and that
the use of mobile ballot boxes and family voting was prevalent.  Similarly, a 99.8%
turnout was reported for elections of  people’s representatives to the Halk Maslahaty in
April 2003, but diplomats reported few signs of voters at the polls.  In August 2003, the
Halk Maslahaty unanimously elected Niyazov its “lifetime chairman,” perhaps signifying
that he will rule from this post after “retiring” as president.  At the same time, the Halk
Maslahaty approved constitutional changes making it the supreme legislative and
executive body and greatly expanding its size.  Niyazov explained that it  would be harder
for coup plotters to take over such a large body.
There are increasing reports of demonstrations and other popular unrest in
Turkmenistan.  Exile opposition groups are being joined by more and more former
officials who flee Turkmenistan.  Such groups include the United Democratic Opposition,
headed by former foreign minister Avdy Kuliyev (Awdy Kulyyew), the People’s
Democratic Movement, headed by former foreign minister Boris Shikhmuradov (Boris
Orazowic Syhmyradow), the Republican Party, headed by former ambassador to Turkey
Muhammad Khanamov (Nurmuhammet Hanamow), and the Fatherland movement,
founded by former prime minister Khudayberdy Orazov (Hudayberdi Orazow).  The latter
three leaders have received life sentences in absentia (except for Shikhmuradov, who was
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apprehended) on charges of instigating the 2002 coup attempt.  Some oppositionists have
warned that the United States should be careful in associating with Niyazov that it is not
perceived by the people as propping up the regime.  
According to most observers, Turkmenistan’s humans rights record is extremely
poor.  The State Department has averred in its Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 2005 that numerous, systematic violations of due process, including
arbitrary arrest and torture, took place with impunity during 2005.  Some prisoners died
due to overcrowding and untreated illnesses.  The International Committee of the Red
Cross continued to be denied full access to prisoners.  The government severely restricted
freedom of speech and assembly.  It completely controlled radio and television and access
to the Internet, and censored all newspapers.  The law characterizes any opposition as
treason and 50-60 people were convicted under this law in 2005. Some political
opponents were sent to psychiatric hospitals.  Some political opponents were forcibly
resettled in rural areas (so-called “internal exiles”).  Ethnic Russians, Uzbeks, and others
faced discrimination that led over half to leave within the past few years.  Religious
practice is closely monitored, including by forbidding religious publishing, requiring that
the Ruhnama be displayed in mosques, banning the building of new mosques, and only
permitting one madrasa to operate.  Some minority religious groups reported government
harassment.  Because of these problems, the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom in May 2006 designated Turkmenistan a “country of particular concern” where
possible aid penalties might be considered.
In March 2003, the government reinstated an exit visa requirement for all citizens
wishing to travel outside the country.  These moves triggered a U.S. presidential report
to Congress in August 2003 that Turkmenistan was violating the freedom of emigration
provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 (the so-called Jackson-Vanik provisions), but a
waiver was issued.  In January 2004, Niyazov lifted the exit visa requirement.  The State
Department’s Country Reports nonetheless stresses that there remain many restrictions
on freedom of travel inside and outside the country.  In 2003, 2004, and 2005, the U.N.
General Assembly’s Third Committee approved resolutions critical of human rights in
Turkmenistan.  The November 2005 resolution, introduced by the United States,
expressed “grave concern” about serious human rights violations.  It called for
international investigations of torture and abuse, and urged continued international
pressure on Turkmenistan to respect human rights.  Rejecting criticism of human rights
abuses, Niyazov asserted in March 2005 that “there is not a single person held in Turkmen
prisons for political motives or ideas.”  Country Reports states that there were some small
improvements in human rights conditions in Turkmenistan during 2005, including the
legalization of five minority religious groups, release of four prisoners of conscience, the
ratification of new child labor laws, and less evidence that child laborers were being used
during the cotton harvest.
Turkmenistan’s  GDP growth was 4% in 2005, declining from 7.5% in 2004, and
consumer price inflation was 10% (International Monetary Fund est.; according to the
IMF, official Turkmen economic data are problematic).  The main sources of GDP growth
were oil, gas, and cotton production.  Turkmenistan is among the world’s top ten in cotton
production, and agriculture accounts for over 50% of employment.  The public sector
accounts for about 75% of GDP.  According to the World Bank, Turkmenistan’s
underlying fiscal position has weakened over the years as public sector deficits have
ballooned (including subsidies for consumer goods and industry and agriculture).
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Niyazov has boosted wages, but wage arrears are high.  Poverty and unemployment are
widespread and may be growing, although a few necessities of life are provided free or
at low cost.  Some observers allege that government corruption is exacerbated by official
involvement in drug trafficking.  A Development Strategy through the year 2020 was
approved by the Halk Maslahaty in 2003 that Niyazov declared would bring Turkmenistan
up to the par of Western states in terms of wealth and the quality of life.  Appearing to
bely Turkmen government assertions that the quality of life is improving, Niyazov in
February 2005 ordered the closure of most local libraries and medical facilities, and the
opening of nature reserves for grazing.  In February 2006, the government instigated a
new retirement system where wage contributions constitute the sole source of pensions.
The U.S. Department of Energy in September 2005 reported estimates of 546 million
barrels of proven oil reserves and 71 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of proven natural gas reserves
in Turkmenistan (which is less than 1% of the proven oil reserves and less than 4% of the
proven gas reserves in the Persian Gulf).  In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s
fourth largest natural gas producer.  It is now largely dependent on Russian export routes,
and gas and oil production remain below the levels of the Soviet period, held back by
aging infrastructure, inadequate investment, and export disputes.  In 1993, Russia had
halted Turkmen gas exports to Western markets through its pipelines, diverting Turkmen
gas to other Eurasian states that had trouble paying for the gas.  In 1997, Russia cut off
these shipments because of transit fee arrears and other problems.  After this,
Turkmenistan was forced to agree to terms offered by Russia’s natural gas firm Gazprom
(or its subsidiary Gazexport). 
Appearing resigned to getting less than the world market price, Niyazov signed a
25-year accord with Russia in 2003 to supply it 200 bcf of gas in 2004 (about 12% of
production), rising to 2.8 tcf in 2009.  The accord called for Turkmenistan to accept 50%
of payments in goods and services.  Again seeking a more equitable deal, Niyazov cut off
gas shipments to Russia in January 2005.  Russia’s Gazprom and Turkmenistan agreed
in April 2005 that Gazprom would pay the previously agreed upon price of $44 per 1,000
cubic meters (mcm) for gas, all in cash, until 2007, when the price would be renegotiated
and take into account world market prices.  However, following Gazprom’s hike in
charges for gas it sold to Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and others at the end of 2005,
Turkmenistan decided that it would increase the price it charged for sales to Gazprom to
$65 per mcm.  The NGO Global Witness alleged in April 2006 that Niyazov keeps some
portion of gas export earnings in his personal bank accounts and that the sector is
otherwise rife with corruption, which makes Turkmenistan an unreliable gas supplier to
Europe, the NGO warned.
Seeking alternative export routes, Turkmenistan in December 1997 opened the first
pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline
linkage to Iran’s pipeline system, but disputes have limited the amount of gas sent to Iran.
Some oil is also sent to Iran in a swap arrangement.  In November 1999, Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey signed a framework accord on a trans-Caspian gas
pipeline.  Contention between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over shipment quotas for this
planned pipeline and other problems led Turkmenistan to reject participation.  The United
States has advocated building such a pipeline since Turkmenistan could transport some
of its gas through routes not controlled by Russia and Iran.  The United States also
endorses Turkmenistan’s proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan
and India, but investment remains elusive.  Iran urges instead that it be the route.
